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NOTE
Conscientious Objector-Welsh v. United States
Already well known as the "conscientious objector case," Welsh v.
United States' (June 14, 1970), reversed the conviction of Petitioner
Elliott Ashton Welsh II for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed
Forces. Welsh had been convicted by a District Court judge whose de-
cision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 404 F.2d 1078 (1968). The
appeals court had affirmed his conviction because it found no religious basis
for his conscientious objector claim.
The statute which provides for exemption based on conscientious ob-
jection is found in the Universal Military Training and Service Act.2
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any per-
son to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.
The petitioner had applied for a conscientious objector exemption but
rather than sign the form statement "I am, by reason of my religious train-
ing and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form,"
he crossed out the words, "religious training and," signing the statement
without them. Also on the same application, he could not affirm any
belief in a supreme being. There seemed to be no dispute as to the sin-
cerity and depth of Welsh's conviction, and the only issue therefore became
whether his areligious objection to war entitled him to an exemption from
the armed forces under 50 U.S.C.A. App. 456(j) ; and/or if the statute
would not grant him the exemption, would it then be in conflict with the
establishment clause of the First Amendment.
The ruling of the court in a decision by Justice Black held that the
statute did not exclude the conscientious objection of Welsh and that in
spite of his own unwillingness to label his beliefs religious, he qualified for
'Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
'Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C.A. App. Sec. 456(j) (1968).
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the conscientious objector exemption based on 50 U.S.C.A. App. 456(j).
The decision by Black was written for a majority of four. They were
joined in result by Justice Harlan whose concurring opinion made the
argument that the statute should be declared unconstitutional for discrim-
inating against those who do not hold conventional religious beliefs.
The dissent by Justice White spoke for a minority of three.
At the beginning of the ruling, the court specifically ruled out passing
on the constitutional question urged by the petitioner and declared instead
that the reversal was based on the court's decision in United States v.
Seeger.3 In that case, Seeger had been denied a conscientious objector
exemption because he would not say that his beliefs were in relation
"to a Supreme Being." He asserted his skepticism in the existence of
God, though he would not deny it, and except for his failure to tie his
beliefs to a supreme being, his objection was found to be in good faith.
The same constitutional question that was raised in Welsh, namely that
the "Supreme Being" clause of the statute unconstitutionally discriminated
between theistic and non-theistic (religious) beliefs, was raised but side-
stepped in Seeger. There were four petitioning parties in that case, and
of them only Seeger would not adhere to the existence of a god or gods.
It was therefore made easy for the court to find an answer in a test for
the definition of a supreme being and for the definition of religion. The
main problem faced in defining these terms was to get around the words
in the statute that "religious training and belief . . . does not include
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code."
The court turned for its solution to the works of theologian Dr. Paul
Tillich, the Bishop of Woolrich John A. T. Robinson, and Ethical Cul-
turist Dr. David Saville Muzzey. Of Tillich the court quoted from the
book Systematic Theology,
I have written of the God above the God of theism. . . . In such a
state (of self-affirmation) the God of both religious and theological
language disappears. But something remains, namely, the seriousness
of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed.
The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, ot
certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism but the
'God above God' the power of being, which works through those who
have no name for it, not even the name God. 4
'United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
IId. at 180.
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They also cite Robinson's book Honest to God, ". . . we are reaching the
point at which the whole conception of a God 'out there,' which has served
us so well since the collapse of the three-decker universe, is itself becoming
more of a hindrance than a help." 5 And even more convincing is this
quote from the book Ethics as a Religion by Dr. Muzzey,
everybody except the avowed atheists (and they are comparatively few)
believes in some kind of God ..... "Instead of positing a personal God,"
whose existence man can neither prove or disprove, the ethical con-
cept is founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric, not theo-
centric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given
of it, must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he
can conceive (italics added). And that ideal is a community of spirits
in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been elicited
by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow
men .... Thus the 'God' that we love is not the figure on the great
white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity
as it should -be, purged of the evil elements which retard its progress
toward 'the knowledge, love and practice of the right.'e
In effect, the court in Seeger used these theoretical works to establish
a standard for clarification of the religious requirement of section 6(j).
In so doing the court was able to come to a conclusion which it felt justice
demanded while avoiding a confrontation with the Constitution. The
value of such a compromise is debatable as an issue, but it appears for
the immediate present that the effect has been much the same. Any doubt
that was left by the Seeger decision was eliminated in Welsh.
The Welsh court interpreted the Seeger decision as establishing the
following test:
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objec-
tion to all war to be 'religious' within the meaning of 6(j) is that this
opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held
with the strength of traditional religious convictions. . . . If an in-
dividual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical
or moral in source and content but which nevertheless impose upon him
a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in war at any time,
those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual 'a place
parallel to that filled by . . . [G]od' in traditionally religious persons.
Id. at 181.
Id., 183.
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Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual
is as much entitled to a 'religious' conscientious objector exemption
under § 6(') as is someone who derives his conscientious objection from
traditional religious convictions. 7
As to Welsh's own refusal to classify his beliefs as religious, the court
made this curious distinction,
When a registrant states that his objections to war are 'religious'
that information is highly relevant to the question of the function his
beliefs have in his life. But very few registrants are fully aware of the
broad scope of the word "religious" as used in 6 (j) and accordingly
a registrant's statement that his beliefs are non-religious is a highly
unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption.8
As far as the ends of justice are concerned, the Welsh decision is
good. In order to make this decision, the Court relied on and even
strengthened the operational definition of religious as laid out in Seeger.
The impact of a decision made this way rather than by facing the con-
stitutional question as is urged by Justice Harlan in his separate opinion
is that the law of the case and the Court itself acquire an existential nature.
In other words, the Court has said in effect-we will define religion
operationally. As long as that definition holds, or as long as a majority
of the court wish to accept that definition, these cases (Seegar and Welsh)
shall be law.
From this, the Welsh case assumes its significance because it works to
make the Seeger decision more permanent. But the Seeger decision was
unanimous, while the Welsh case was a closer call. The possibility now
exists that a conservative court-less erudite than that which quoted
ethical culturism and less sensitive to the depth of feeling that an in-
dividual can have about war-will merely redefine "religious" in a tradi-
tional manner thereby erasing the substance of Seeger-Welsh law with ease.
This possibility seems to be the result of an overall politization of the
Court in recent years. The secure feeling that the United States Supreme
Court was the final, unquestioned authority of the law is disappearing.
And the Court itself manifests this loss of imperishability in decisions
like this one. Although the influence on the court of the Vietnam War,
the increasing repression, and worsening domestic violence cannot be
quantitatively measured, one cannot help but feel that these conditions have
' Welsh v. U.S., supra 1796.
'Id., 1797.
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made the Court somewhat insecure; and that this insecurity has fostered
a feeling of impermanence within the Court.
This sensation pervades the Welsh decision even though it is absent
in most of the contemporary cases which have less substantive law at
stake. The consequences in law of this feeling of transience are as yet
indeterminable. One can only hope that the Seeger and Welsh cases will
endure, and even more importantly-that the ends of fairness and justice
that they serve will not be lost.
DEBORAH MAILMAN
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